

LOCKE ON THE INTELLECTUAL BASIS OF SIN - (Revised)

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The *Essay concerning Human Understanding* was published at the end of 1689.¹ It sold well, and within three years Locke was planning revisions for a second edition. Among those whose “advice and assistance” he sought was the Irish scientist William Molyneux. Locke had begun a correspondence with Molyneux a few months before, after the latter had lavishly praised the *Essay* and its author in the Epistle Dedicatory of his own *Dioptrica Nova*, published early in 1692. Here was a man, Locke concluded, whose judgment one could trust. He returned Molyneux’s compliment in the *Essay*’s new edition, calling him “that very Ingenious and Studious promoter of real Knowledge, ... whom I am proud to call my friend” (2-5 II.ix.8: 145-46).

Molyneux at first declined to make any substantive suggestions for improving the *Essay*, not wishing, apparently, to imply that he thought there were faults in it. But Locke pressed him, and eventually Molyneux did venture some critical comments. His chief target was Locke’s “Discourse about Mans Liberty and Necessity” in Chapter xxi of Book II, “Of Power.” Of this, Molyneux remarked that its “Thread seems so wonderfully fine spun ..., that at last the Great Question of Liberty and Necessity seems to Vanish.” He then noted that Locke, in this discussion, “seem[s] to make all Sins to proceed from our Understandings, or to be against Conscience; and not at all from the Depravity of our Wills,” adding that “it seems harsh to say, that a Man shall be Damn’d, because he understands no better than he does” (C 1579: IV.600-01).

In his next letter Locke addressed his friend’s assessment. To the first part of it he replied: “I do not wonder to find you think my discourse about liberty a little too fine spun, I had so much that thought of it my self, that I said the same thing of it to some of my friends before it was printed, and told them that upon that account I judg’d it best to leave it out.”²

Locke made a different response to the second part of Molyneux’s judgment, however. “I think,” he writes, “there might be something said, which with a great many men would pass for a satisfactory answer to your objection; but it not satisfying me, I neither put it into my book, nor shall now into my letter. If I have put any fallacy on my self in all that deduction, as it may be, and I have been ready to suspect it my self, you will do me a very acceptable kindness to shew it me that I may reform it” (C 1592: IV.625).

In the event Molyneux did not show Locke any fallacy in his thinking. No matter to Locke, however, since he himself found a flaw, or so he regarded it.³ In any case, Locke changed his opinion rather substantially concerning several matters discussed in the chapter “Of Power,” and he made major revisions of its text accordingly. In particular, in the *Essay*’s second edition this chapter contains a view of motivation - a view, in Locke’s terms, as to “what determines the will” - that is not merely different from but in some points directly opposed to his original view.

In this paper I want to focus on Molyneux’s “objection” to Locke’s position in the first edition of the *Essay*. In a word, the objection is that Locke is guilty of “intellectualism” with respect to human motivation, at least in the case of actions with moral significance. This objection embodies two distinct claims. Molyneux is alleging, on the one hand, that Locke’s position is an instance of intellectualism, and on the other that intellectualism is in some way a false or an inadequate doctrine.

I shall confine myself to the first of these two allegations. My first task will be to spell out the doctrine of intellectualism as Molyneux understands it, and to determine whether its tenets are indeed to be found in Locke’s original view of motivation. But then I shall, secondly, examine the revised view which appeared in the *Essay*’s second edition, and consider the extent to which intellectualist elements may also be present in it. Finally, I shall take note of some further changes that came into Locke’s thinking about motivation as a result of his correspondence, late in his life, with Philippus van Limborch. My overall conclusion will be that Locke may never have been wholly and simply an intellectualist with respect to motivation, even, as Molyneux thought, in the first edition of the *Essay*; that he certainly never was wholly and simply an anti- or a non-intellectualist, even, as some recent commentators have claimed, in the second edition; and that there may be more intellectualism in his final thoughts on the subject than there was in his second or even his first thoughts.

Intellectualism is the doctrine that how one behaves, at least in the moral arena, is determined by what one believes it is right or good or bad or wrong to do: one does what one thinks is right, and doesn’t do what one thinks is wrong. According to the intellectualist, then, an agent can only act wrongly or badly if she has a false opinion as

to what the right or best action in the circumstances is - a moral fault entails an intellectual one. Of course provisos must be added if this doctrine is to be at all plausible. Among other things, external constraints sometimes prevent actions intended or undertaken from being carried out; and the actions that agents judge to be right or the best are sometimes not in their power to perform. A credible version of intellectualism will have to take account of these facts.⁴

Furthermore, if intellectualism is even to be looked for in the position of Locke, that doctrine has to be formulated in a way that provides for the will. For Locke, and apparently for Molyneux too, only voluntary actions have moral qualities; and a voluntary action is an action that “follows the will,” in the sense that it not only succeeds but is produced by an act of volition. The volition is conceived as an intermediary between the action’s ultimate motive and the action itself. The motive, as Locke puts it, “determines the will to action,” and the resulting volition is that which produces the action, both prompting it and specifying its nature. For Locke to be an intellectualist, then, he must hold that what determines the will, at least in the case of actions with moral significance, is always some intellectual or cognitive state of the agent. If the agent concludes or believes that an action is good, she wills to perform it; if she thinks it is bad, she doesn’t so will, or perhaps she wills not to perform it.

Before turning to consider whether Locke does hold this view, I want to consider the alternatives to intellectualism as a doctrine of moral motivation. In his letter Molyneux indicates that what accounts for our immoral actions in his opinion is not the imperfection of our intellects but the “depravity of our wills.” A depraved will is one that not only does produce but is generally disposed to produce immoral actions, but Molyneux gives us no clue as to what he thinks such a disposition might consist in. There seem to be three possibilities. First, a will might be depraved because it is apt to be driven by illicit passions, that is, by occurrent feelings or desires such as anger and lust. Second, a will might come to be depraved by being subservient to some evil trait of character or vice, dishonesty or cruelty for instance. Finally, a will might have acquired the habit of determining itself to wrong actions, not in response to any motivating factor outside itself, but by acting on its own. This last possibility would not have been an option for the ancients, who had no conception of an autonomous will. But it would have been attractive to some of Locke’s contemporaries, including Molyneux’s countryman William King, who indeed criticized Locke for making the will a “passive power.” The truth, according to King, is that the will “is an active power [that] determines it self in its choice and is not determined by another.” Since King’s criticism was communicated to Locke by Molyneux, there is perhaps reason to think that the latter might himself have been sympathetic to King’s position (C 1544: IV.540).

Is then the position that Locke takes on motivation in his first treatment of the subject an instance of intellectualism? It might not at first seem so. Locke poses the question “what ‘tis determines the Will” in Section 29 of the chapter “Of Power”; and his initial answer is that “*Good ..., the greater Good is that alone which determines the Will*” (1 II.xxi.29: 248n). But in reaching this answer Locke identifies good with happiness and happiness with pleasure (and evil with misery and pain), whence it follows that what really determines the will is pleasure (and pain, in a negative way). And pleasure, surely, is capable of moving the will directly; there is no need for an agent who is feeling it to judge or believe that he is doing so in order for this feeling to be effective in determining his will.

In the course of elaborating this initial answer, however, Locke makes a distinction between present pleasure, pleasure which accompanies something an agent is currently doing, and pleasure which is to be felt in the future, as a consequence of some present action. With respect to the former, he then claims, “a Man never chuses amiss [since] Things in their present enjoyment, are what they seem” (1 II.xxi.37: 267-68n). In the case of actions, however, which “carry not all the Happiness, and Misery, that depend on them, along with them in their present performance; but are the precedent Causes of Good and Evil, which they draw after them, and bring upon us, when they themselves are passed,” that which “makes us will the doing or omitting any Action in our Power, *is the greater Good* appearing to result from that choice in all its Consequences, as far as at present they are represented to our view” (ibid. 269-70n). But apparent good and represented consequences are not entities that actually exist; it is only by being objects of thought that they are able to function as motivational factors. In order for any good to appear to result from the represented consequences of some choice an agent proposes to make, the agent must envisage those consequences and estimate the good they will bring. And this requires the use of his understanding to perform intellectual operations: making judgments and forming beliefs. Hence it is that we can be mistaken in such cases; and it is precisely to “wrong Judgment,” Locke says, that these mistakes are all due (1 II.xxi.39[=2-561]: 274).

It appears, then, that Molyneux's reading of Locke is correct. Locke's position is an instance of intellectualism in that it makes wrong judgment - faulty performance on the part of the understanding - the cause of bad choices, and thence of immoral action. On the other hand, Locke may hold this position with respect only to cases in which the pleasure determining choice is at least partly absent, because future and consequential. The situation is different for choices prompted solely by present pleasure and pain. Here the agent's will may be determined directly by what he is feeling, so that no judgment or prediction or hope or intellectual activity of any other kind need be involved. That such choices occur in our lives is suggested, if not explicitly stated, by Locke in a number of passages (for example, in Sections 37, 42, and 44 of **1** II.xxi).⁵ And to the extent that they do, the intellectualism of his account of motivation is diminished.

So much for Locke's position in the first edition of the *Essay*. In the revised version of the chapter on power which appeared in the second edition, Locke's view of motivation is considerably different. Indeed he presents it as a repudiation of his earlier view. What determines the will, he now says, is not "the greater good in view: But some (and for the most part the most pressing) *uneasiness* a Man is at present under" (**2-5** II.xxi.31: 250-51). This uneasiness is an occurrent feeling, a kind of pain in fact: it is the feeling that constitutes *desire* (or at least always accompanies it - Locke vacillates on this). In his earlier account Locke had drawn no clear distinction between desiring and willing. But now he pronounces them "two distinct Acts of the mind," each with its own kind of object and distinctive phenomenal character (**2-5** II.xxi.30: 249-250).

According to Locke's new view of motivation, what happens when an agent performs a voluntary action is that she first desires something, and then wills an action designed to attain the object of this desire. Her desiring, or more precisely the uneasiness belonging to it, determines her will, in the sense of efficiently causing her act of volition, which in turn produces the action. Since "desire" is defined as "an uneasiness of the Mind for want of some absent good" (251), we cannot say that "the greater good in view" no longer plays any role in Locke's account; on the contrary, since the object of desire will always be something perceived to be good. Locke's point rather is that no mere perception of good - no bare judgment or opinion as to the pleasure that some contemplated action is likely to bring - suffices to determine the will of the agent. It is quite possible, Locke now maintains, to see something as good, and yet not desire it. To desire is not merely to think something desirable; it is to feel the pain of not having it: our desire "makes us uneasy in the want of it" (253). And it is only this feeling of pain, this uneasiness, that actually touches the will, so as to "set us on work." For "'tis uneasiness alone [that] operates on the will" (254); only uneasiness "immediately determines" its choice (252).

In Locke's new account, therefore, what directly determines the will is always some present feeling, and not any cognitive or intellectual state of the agent. Furthermore, an agent might well make a moral mistake - do something morally wrong - not because she didn't know what would have been best in the situation, but because she didn't desire the good that the right action would have produced. So it looks as if the intellectualism of Locke's earlier position has been abandoned. This indeed has been the judgment of a number of commentators, from Ollion to Colman, and including John Yolton, who has written that Locke "had taken the intellectualist position on motives in the first edition of the *Essay*, but he firmly rejected it as false in later editions."⁶

My own judgment, however, is somewhat different. It is true that a new, non-intellectual factor has been injected into the motivational situation in Locke's second view. But it is not true that this new factor has simply replaced the intellectual element that dominated Locke's first account, driving the latter altogether out of the picture. For the fact is that agents' judgments and opinions as to the good and bad of the actions they envisage continue to play a large and indeed an indispensable role in the motivation of such actions.

In the first place, desire itself contains a cognitive or intellectual element. Desire for Locke must include (or at least be accompanied by) a feeling of uneasiness, but it also must have an object, and the desirer must be aware of this object. That is, she must cognize or conceive the thing she desires, and she must conceive it, moreover, as something good, a source of pleasure - which is to say, she must believe something if not make a judgment about it. One consequence of this is that, since desire must occur in every case in which the will is determined, the understanding is involved in the motivation even of choices wholly prompted by pleasure presently felt. "Whatever our enjoyment," Locke writes, "we look beyond the present, and desire goes with our foresight ... So that even in *joy* it self, that which keeps up the action, whereon the enjoyment depends, is the desire to continue it" (**2-5** II.xxi.39: 257). This marks a further point of difference from the position that Locke may have taken in the first version of Chapter xxi. As noted earlier, he may have held there that the mere feeling of joy is sufficient to move the agent to continue whatever she is doing; so that no desire to continue, and hence no judgment as to what she is feeling or doing or is likely to feel or do in the future, is necessary. If so, then the scope of Locke's intellectualism is extended in his second view. For it now appears that every voluntary action is motivated, at least partly, by some cognitive state of the agent.⁷

Second, it is a significant tenet of Locke's new position that desires are capable of being generated by antecedent conceptions and judgments of the goodness of the things we desire. Thus "due, and repeated Contemplation," he says, is capable of bringing some absent good, which we have recognized as such but have not judged to be essential to our present happiness, "nearer to the Mind," of giving "some relish" to it, and raising "in us some desire; which then beginning to make a part of our present *uneasiness*, ... comes in its turn to determine the *will*" (2-5 II.xxi. 45: 262). In this way, Locke continues, "by a due consideration and examining any good proposed, it is in our power, to raise our desires, ... whereby [that good] may come to work upon the *will*, and be pursued" (2-5 II.xxi.46: 262). It follows, he later notes, that it is within "a Man's power to change the pleasantness, and unpleasantness" of things (2-5 II.xxi. 69: 280). This is not the view Locke had taken in his original version of Chapter xxi. Indeed, he had explicitly maintained the contrary, saying that it is not "in [anyone's] choice, whether he will, or will not be better pleased with one thing than another" (1 II.xxi. 28: 248n).

The importance of intellectual operations in motivation is reinforced by one of the most striking features of Locke's second thoughts on the subject. This is the doctrine that an agent who, while deliberating what to do, is "beset by sundry uneasiness" competing to determine the will, often is able "to suspend the execution and satisfaction of any of [his] desires" and so keep his will from being determined to any action. For the point of suspending one's desires is "to consider the objects of them; examine them on all sides, and weigh them with others"; and thus "to examine, view, and judge, of the good or evil of what we are going to do" (2-5 II.xxi.47: 263). In many cases such suspension results in a change in the content or relative strength of the agent's desires, and his will is determined differently from the way it otherwise would have been. But in every case, once, "upon due *Examination*, we have judg'd, we have done our duty, all that we can, or ought to do, in pursuit of our happiness." Moreover, Locke adds, "'tis not a fault, but a perfection of our nature to desire, will, and act according to the last result of a fair *Examination*" (2-5 II.xxi.47: 263-64).

This last statement of Locke's is characteristic of several that are to be found in his revised version of Chapter xxi, extolling the suitability and power of rational judgment as a factor in motivation. Still, it remains true that the intellectualism of Locke's later position is a weaker doctrine than that of its predecessor. According to Locke's first account, an agent's judgment that a certain action is the best - that is, apt to produce the most pleasure - in some set of circumstances is sufficient to determine her will to that action, besides being necessary in cases of future pleasure. In his later account, no such judgment by itself suffices to move the will, even though some judgment about the consequences of projected actions is necessary in all cases, those involving present as well as future pleasure. It might be claimed that this weaker doctrine is not really intellectualism, that this designation is properly reserved for the view that knowing the good is sufficient and not merely necessary for willing it. I have no wish to dispute about names; but I would point out that Locke's later view still differs significantly from other views that philosophers have held. For example, each of the three alternatives to intellectualism that I mentioned earlier - occurrent passionism, moral dispositionalism, and autonomous voluntarism - has a version in which no cognitive factor is required for the will to be determined (although each also has a version in which such a factor is required). And certainly the radical voluntarists of Locke's own time - incompatibilist libertarians such as King and the Arminians - insisted that the will could on occasion determine itself, whether or not any judgment or anything else had occurred antecedent to it.

Molyneux's objection, that Locke's theory makes sin the consequence of intellectual error, thus has no force against the latter's second thoughts on motivation. But these were not to be Locke's final thoughts on this subject. Six years after the publication of the *Essay*'s second edition, he came to consider these matters again in his correspondence with Van Limborch. Van Limborch thought he detected some movement towards his own Arminian conception of free will in Locke's revised version of Chapter xxi, and he tried to get his friend to acknowledge this. Locke, however, resisted this effort. Although he did finally concede one point to Van Limborch - that not only action subsequent to willing but willing itself sometimes is free⁸ - for the most part he seemed anxious to put distance between himself and the Arminians. Induced by Van Limborch to consider more carefully just how judgment bears on volition, Locke stresses the power of the understanding vis à vis that of the will, so much so that he appears not only to return to the intellectualism of his initial position but to embrace an even stronger form of it.

Here are two excerpts from passages Locke wrote at the time (and obviously in consequence) of his correspondence with Van Limborch for inclusion in the fifth edition of the *Essay*:

... every Man is put under a necessity by his constitution, as an intelligent Being, to be determined in willing by his own Thought and Judgment, what is best for him to do ... (5 II.xxi.48: 264)

... a Man may justly incur punishment, though it be certain that in all the particular actions that he wills, he does, and necessarily does will that, which he judges to be good. For though his will be always determined by that, which is judg'd good by his Understanding, yet it excuses him not: Because, by a too hasty choice of his own making, he has imposed on himself wrong measures of good and evil; which however false and fallacious, have the same influence on all his future conduct, as if they were true and right. He has vitiated his own Palate, and must be answerable to himself for the sickness and death that follows from it. (5 II.xxi.56: 270-71)

These passages clearly express the doctrine of the *Essay*'s first edition, that no agent can will to do that which she believes to be bad, so that every sin is the result of intellectual deficiency, ignorance or mistaken belief. Locke is not here abandoning the view, advanced in the second edition, that the will can only be immediately moved by desire. His point is that desire, when effective, is always prompted by a judgment as to the goodness or badness of the desired object. And this does conflict with the claim made in the second edition that some "of the various *uneasinesses*, that determine the will ... come from causes not in our power" such as bodily pains, which often operate "forcibly on the will"; whereas other *uneasinesses* "arise from our desires of absent good; which desires always bear proportion to, and depend on the judgment we make" of that absent good (2-5 II.xxi.57: 271-72). Locke's position in these passages is that every determination of the will is consequent upon some intellectual performance on the part of the agent, albeit indirectly, by way of desire.

What is most striking in these passages, however, is the suggestion that there is some kind of *necessary* connection between willing and judging, even if via desiring: given the right kind of judgment a desire must ensue, and from that a volition, so that the willing necessarily follows the judging. This suggestion is not developed by Locke, nor is the nature and basis of the necessity in question made plain. But if, as appears from these passages, Locke is now tying volition to judgment even more tightly than he had done in the first edition, where no mention is made of necessity in this connection, then the intellectualism of his last thoughts on motivation is indeed more pronounced than that of his first ones.⁹

NOTES

1 References to the *Essay* are made via page number of the Clarendon edition, ed. by Peter Nidditch (Oxford, 1975), preceded by a numeral in boldface to indicate which original edition is cited when that information matters. (Some first edition passages are printed as notes at the bottom of the page in the Nidditch edition; in citations of such passages the letter “n” follows the page number.) References to Locke’s correspondence are made via letter number and volume and page number in the Clarendon edition, ed. by E.S. de Beer (Oxford, 1976-89), thus: C 2881: VI.274.

2 Locke wrote a similar thing to van Limborch some years later: see C 2866: VII.252. In the end, Locke says that he was persuaded to retain his discussion of liberty by these same friends, among whom he evidently included Le Clerc, the “very ingenious but professed Arminian” who, upon being shown Locke’s discourse, “frankly confessed he could carry it [*scil.* either “his objections” or the discourse itself] no farther” (C 1592 to Molyneux: IV.625). Le Clerc, however, gives a quite different account of this episode: see his review of the posthumously published letters of Locke in the *Bibliothèque Choisie* XVII (1709): 234-41, pp. 235-36.

The depth of Locke’s doubts on the subject of freedom, as well as a possible source of them, is revealed by a striking admission he makes in the same letter to Molyneux. “I own freely to you,” he writes,

the weakness of my understanding, that though it be unquestionable that there is omnipotence and omniscience in God our maker, and I cannot have a clearer perception of any thing than that I am free, yet I cannot make freedom in man consistent with omnipotence and omniscience in God, though I am as fully persuaded of both as of any truths I most firmly assent to. And therefore I have long since given off the consideration of that question, resolving all into this short conclusion, That if it be possible for God to make a free agent, then man is free, though I see not the way of it. (C 1592: IV.625-26)

(Le Clerc makes an astute comment on this passage in his review, pp. 236-37.)

3 Molyneux’s comments did serve to reinforce Locke’s own earlier doubts on the matter. At the end of his new version of Chapter xxi in the second edition he writes that, because of these doubts and Molyneux’s “suspicions,” he was “put upon a stricter review of this Chapter”; and that, “lighting upon a very easy, and scarce observable slip I had made, in putting one seemingly indifferent word for another, that discovery open’d to me this present view,” i.e. the view he has just finished expounding (2-5 II.xxi.71: 282).

This raises an interesting puzzle for Locke scholars. First, what is the “one word” that Locke is referring to? And second, just how did his mistake regarding this word lead him to repudiate his original view and to develop the new one that he put in its place? As to the first, he told Molyneux that the mistaken word is “things,” the right word being “actions” (C 1643: IV.700). But the former does not occur on the page of the first edition that Locke cites, nor the latter in the revised text of that page. If we assume, as Molyneux did, that he rather meant “thing” and “action,” respectively, then the problem is that there are two places on the page in question where the former occurs and is replaced by the latter in the second edition, one in the first sentence of Section 28 - which is the one that Molyneux took Locke to mean (C 1652: IV.716) - and the other in the first sentence of Section 25 (see de Beer’s note on Locke’s letter, C 1643: IV.700). So which of these two did Locke have in mind?

Secondly, it is not obvious, and Locke does nothing to show, that his original use of the word “thing” was mistaken, or how it is that substituting “action” leads to a different view, let alone “the correct view” of what determines the will. Not many commentators have considered this issue either. Of those who have, only two that I know of - P. Ramsey and K. Jacobi - have ventured opinions as to how Locke’s “mistake” is supposed to account for the change in his view. Ramsey’s suggestion (pp. 58-60 of his edition of Jonathan Edwards’ *Freedom of the Will* (New Haven, 1957)) is coherent and internally sound; but it gives a large role to a distinction - that between the object of choice and the act of choosing - that Locke hardly notices, much less explicitly draws. As for Jacobi, his account (pp. 199-200 of his article “Locke und Leibniz über den Begriff der menschlichen Freiheit und über die Motivation menschlichen Wollens und Wählens,” *Studia Leibnitiana*, Supplementa XIX (1980): 194-205) is vitiated by a mistake in the location of Locke’s slip, which he places in the fourth instead of the first sentence of Section 28 - a sentence which has no counterpart in the second edition. Jacobi seems not even to have noticed the “thing” in the first sentence, for in the German translation of this sentence that he quotes, the word used to render “thing” is “Handlung,” which means not “thing” but “action” - the very word that Locke says it was a mistake not to have had there in the first place! I am myself inclined to agree with John Colman, who writes: “it is by no means clear why [Locke] supposes his use of ‘thing’ to be a mistake nor how his noticing it gave rise to the modifications in his view of freedom” (*John Locke’s Moral Philosophy* (Edinburgh, 1983), 266, n. 7).

4 There is a complication here that needs to be noted: this concerns Locke's peculiar conception of moral rectitude. To be morally right, for Locke, an action must produce good, which is to say, pleasure. But it must, in addition, conform to some properly grounded rule or law. And not every action resulting in pleasure does so conform, nor does every action resulting in pain violate some moral law. It is not even Locke's position that the best action in some set of circumstances, the one that produces the most pleasure among the available alternatives, is the morally right thing to do, though he sometimes writes as if this were his view. We might question Locke's basis for holding that all actions that conform to moral laws are good, i.e. produce pleasure as well: on this he is both unconvincing and obscure. But there is little doubt that he does hold this, so that moral rectitude entails goodness for Locke but does not coincide with it. In this paper I shall largely ignore this complication. That is, I shall assume that the only judgment that is relevant to the moral quality of an action performed or proposed by an agent is the judgment regarding the pleasure or pain that action is apt to produce, as opposed to the judgment regarding its conformity to or deviation from some moral law. My justification for this is just that Locke seems to make the same assumption throughout his discussion of motivation.

5 The Section 37 passage is on pp. 268-69n. Sections 42 and 44 in **1** correspond, respectively, to Sections 64 and 67 in **2-5**; the passages in question occur on pp. 276-77 and 278. In an earlier version of this paper I was more confident in ascribing to Locke the view that present pleasure determines the will of an agent directly, without the intervention of any judgment or belief e.g. that the present state is one of pleasure. But this ascription was questioned by a reviewer for this *Journal*, who thinks that Locke holds the contrary view, on the grounds that his general doctrine that "when we see, hear, smell, taste, feel, meditate, or will any thing, we know that we do so" (**2-5** II.xxvii.9: 335) commits him to saying "that the agent knows that her present state is pleasant; [and] it would be odd if [Locke] thought the will to continue [the action producing the pleasure] was caused exclusively by the feeling of pleasure rather than the belief [*scil.* entailed by her knowledge]." I grant that Locke's text admits of this interpretation, but would claim (a) that it by no means requires it and (b) that the text is at the least open to my reading of it as well, which I still am inclined to accept, albeit with diminished assurance. (In Note 7 I cite some positive evidence from Locke's second edition in favor of my interpretation of the first on this issue.)

6 J.W. Yolton, *Locke and the Compass of Human Understanding* (Cambridge, 1970), 144. Colman says that Locke's position in the second edition marks a shift "from an emphasis on the intellectual apprehension of good as the motive determining the will to what might be taken as an account of the non-intellectual roots of action" (*John Locke's Moral Philosophy*, 215). And according to Henri Ollion, for Locke in the second edition, "l'estimation du plus grand bien est affaire de raison, au lieu que l'uneasiness, ou le desir, se porte aveuglement vers son objet" (*La philosophie générale de John Locke* (Paris, 1908), 382).

7 The fact that Locke, in the second edition, cites the "desire to continue" as the motive to keep on doing something enjoyable, and didn't do so in the first, is perhaps some reason for thinking that in his first view he did hold that the feeling of joy by itself determines the will to continue, apart from any judgment or belief of the agent as to her emotional state. (See Note 5 above). There is also the fact that the marginal summary of the section in which this matter is broached in the second edition, Section 58, refers to "our Judgment of present Good"; whereas the summary of the corresponding first edition section, 37, does not (indeed, this section has no summary of its own, but comes under that for Section 36: "Why they [*scil.* Men] chuse amiss").

8 I have discussed this subject - the point as well as Locke's concession of it - in "Locke on the Freedom of the Will," in *Locke's Philosophy: Content and Context*, ed. by G.A.J. Rogers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming). See also Ronald M. de Schepper, "'Free Will' or the Liberty of Man in Willing: Philippus van Limborch's Influence on John Locke's *Essay concerning Human Understanding*," to be published in the Proceedings of a conference, "Philosophy in the Netherlands in the 17th and 18th Centuries," held at the Erasmus University of Rotterdam in November 1988.

9 An earlier version of this paper was presented as part of a Symposium on "John Locke after Three-hundred Years," with John Yolton and James Tully, at the December 1990 meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division. An abstract of this version was published, under the title "Locke's Moral Psychology," in the *Journal of Philosophy* 87 (1990) 524-25.